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McDaniel: Theology of the Real Economy

INTRODUCTION
“Financialization” is a term bantered about by economists and financial analysts
for the past couple of decades to describe the process by which economic activity
shifts from “real” production of goods and services to ever more complex forms
of financial transacting. Various interpretations of this phenomenon have been
offered from Nobel laureate James Tobin’s observation of the “casino aspect of
our financial markets” to the definition Greta Krippner applies: a “pattern of
accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial
channels rather than through trade and commodity production.”1 Thomas Palley
says it is the process by which financial institutions, markets, and elites “gain
greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes.”2
Yet some are leery in even approaching the subject for the implication that
there should be some appropriate level of financial control vis-à-vis other activity
in capitalist economies determined beyond markets. Talk of disallowing or taxing
disproportionately certain types of investments, restricting the compensation of
financial managers, or taking political action to break up the financial industry
implies social constructivism of the kind Friedrich Hayek warned against. What is
for some the manipulation of financial markets by elites is, for others, a natural
development in capitalist economies that leverages technology, human creativity,
and the acquisitive nature of the individual in a global culture where profitability
is considered necessary to survival.3 If recent innovations and the explosion of
financial activity are natural developments, then attempts to regulate their
outcomes may well have unintended and undesirable consequences. Indeed, the
enormity and controversial nature of the Dodd-Frank Bill passed in July 2010
suggests that we may be embarking on a tit-for-tat game between regulatory
agencies and banking and investment firms that has the potential to worsen

James Tobin, “On the Efficiency of the Financial System,” Lloyds Bank Review, 1-2, 15 (July 1984). Greta
Krippner, “What is Financialization?” mimeo; Department of Sociology, UCLA; cited in Gerald A. Epstein,
Financialization and the World Economy (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 3.
2
Thomas I. Palley, “Financialization: What It Is and Why it Matters,” Levy Economics Institute, Working
Paper no. 525 (December 2007): 2; accessed at http://www.levy.org on 22 March 2011. John Bellamy Foster
provides a brief etymology of this term financialization in “The Financialization of Capitalism,” Monthly
Review 58 (April 2007); accessed at http://www.monthlyreview.org/0407jbf.htm on 21 March 2011. See also
Ozgür Orhangazi, Financialization and the US Economy (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing
Limited, 2008).
3
Robert E. Litan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, authored a paper defending changes in the finance
industry over the past several decades and, while acknowledging “a mix between good and bad financial
innovations,” he says, “on balance I find more good ones than bad ones.” See “In Defense of Much, But Not
All, Financial Innovation,” Brookings (February 17, 2010); accessed at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0217_financial_innovation_litan.aspx on 30 June 2011.

1

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2010

1

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 2 [2010], Art. 1

bureaucratic inefficiency, concentrate market power, and perhaps even further
destabilize the financial system.4
Despite the good of financial innovations over the past century, recent
developments are troubling and the weight of both popular and scholarly opinion
suggests something has gone wrong in the global financial system. Although not
using the exact term, religious critics of practices that led to the crisis admonish
behaviors similar to those associated with financialization. In his 2009 encyclical
Caritas in Veritate (Charity in Truth), Pope Benedict echoes the criticism of
many religious observers by describing the “damaging effects on the real
economy of badly managed and largely speculative financial dealing.”5 Such
comments by religious leaders are common yet they imply incompletely
articulated ideals of what constitutes real economic growth. Christian critics are
often unclear in showing how, in an age of ever-increasing financial specialization
and sophistication, it is possible to distinguish real production from what they
perceive as financial sophistry and how religious values, practices, or institutions
might aid this effort. How are we to determine those financial activities that
siphon resources from more socially beneficial uses? At what point does financial
innovation cease to benefit the general economy and turn purely self-interested?
Are there moral guidelines within Christianity capable of establishing tangible
and reliable boundaries for investment and curbing the trend of financialization?
This essay addresses these questions by briefly reflecting on the crisis, surveying
both secular and Christian responses to it, and proposing ecumenical engagement
in “theology of the real economy” to substantiate religious criticism of
financialization, help guide the growing sector of faith-based investment, and
contribute to a more ethical foundation for the global economy.
One of the primary criticisms of financialization is that it has “legitimized
the adoption of strict monetary calculation over the many immaterial and social
issues implied in economic choices.”6 Some of those social issues are inevitably
religious or influenced by religious institutions and practices. This essay observes
some of the negative consequences of financialization – arbitrariness in wealth
creation, rising financial instability, growth in moral hazard – and contends that
reliance on government regulation to resolve these issues will not succeed
because of the embeddedness of regulatory agencies in the political system7 and
4

Arthur D. Postal, “Industry, Legislators, and Administration Clash over Dodd-Frank Implementation,”
National Underwriter: Property and Casualty (April 25, 2011); 115, 15; ProQuest pg. 24.
5
Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 2009, no. 21.
6
GianDemetrio Matrangoni and Stefano Solari, “The ‘Good Company’ and Financialization: Corporate
Choices, Institutional Environment, and Catholic Social Thought”; paper presented at the Sixth International
Symposium on Catholic Social Thought and Management Education, Pontifical University of St.
Thomas, Rome, Italy (October 5-7, 2006); accessed at http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/
conferences/thegoodcompany/Finalpapers/marangoni-solariUST.pdf on 6 June 2011.
7
Richard Freeman, “It’s financialization!” International Labour Review 149, no. 2 (2010): 178.
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their inability to control (or even to discern) participants’ incentives in the
complexity of financial markets. Developing an ethical basis for investment
requires broad institutional support. Another lesson being learned in the crisis is
that “it takes a village” to balance elements of the global economy in achieving
morally and materially sustainable growth. Christianity, as the largest religious
tradition of the Western world, has millions of investor adherents with enormous
potential to shape the nature of finance and investment.
The severity of present problems suggests that resolution must be bottomup not top-down, involving transformation of the financial culture. Broad
ecumenical participation in theological development offering religious
perspectives on what comprises real economic growth could enable avenues for
value expression through investment in an age when investors are increasingly
uncertain of what they own and whether their holdings are consistent with their
beliefs. It can also help overcome D. Stephen Long’s observation that
“theological language is primarily protest – against the market and the church,
often in the name of social facts that do not seem to have been given a theological
reading.”8 Establishing theological parameters for real production can contribute
to the achievement of justice in the global economy and perhaps even reduce the
need for state regulation that many have called for but few desire.
EVIDENCE OF FINANCIALIZATION
The global financial crisis was caused by a confluence of forces. Freshly
deregulated banks and investment firms began testing traditional boundaries in
attempts to maximize profits, implicitly constructing new standards for risk and
return. Consumers pressed a similar envelope on what is “affordable housing,”
engaging innovative forms of mortgage financing that leveraged families as never
before. Corporations in non-financial sectors saw greener pastures in possibilities
for large returns from the investment side of their organizations, often neglecting
traditional lines of business. A system of enormous complexity grew beyond the
abilities of regulators to control (or even adequately observe) its extreme
tendencies.
In many ways the crisis resulted from natural responses to market
conditions by participants who believed they were following the rules of the game
they were presented to their logical conclusion. Moreover, that aspect of the
financial system seems not to have changed much. Wall Street traders and
analysts likely engage in many of the same practices today that they performed
before 2008. Simon Johnson, a professor at MIT and former chief economist for
the International Monetary Fund, believes that incentives are still “distorted” such
8

D. Stephen Long, Divine Economy: Theology and the Market (New York: Routledge, 2000), 262.
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that if banks were to “turn themselves into well-behaved, responsible entities that
never cause another financial crisis, economics will have failed.”9 Johnson
suggests that incentives for risky behavior are greater today because the “reform”
policies undertaken have transformed companies that once perceived themselves
as too big to fail into institutions that are “definitely too big to fail.”10 Already
there is talk of “reform fatigue” after passage in the U.S. of the Financial Reform
Bill and complementary Basel III Accord in Europe.11 Compensation for bankers,
financial services managers, and others that have been pilloried in the crisis has
changed little.12 The EU’s internal market commissioner, Michael Barnier, stated
regarding bank bonuses in 2011: "I think a certain number of bankers haven't
understood. It's restarting like before. The calls for moderation haven't been
heard."13
Palley sees the increasing debt load in the U.S. as defining of
financialization, noting how credit market debt grew from 140 to 328.6 percent of
GDP from 1973 to 2005.14 Other evidence of this phenomenon include alterations
in the functional distribution of income, stagnation of wages, and rising income
inequality resulting from action by “financial sector interests.”15 Income changes
arising from financialization occur because of the increasing detachment of
financial transactions from the real production of goods and services; according to
Charles Leadbeater, “economies have become overlaid with a heavy financial
superstructure bearing little relation to underlying activity.”16 The transition from
national, industrial economies to global information- and service-based
economies over the past century, however, makes it unsurprising that finance has
risen in importance. Technology has facilitated greater volume of financial
transactions and greater complexity of those transactions. The question to be
answered is what should be the magnitude of financial versus other economic
activity in contributing to some conceptual entity we can describe as the real
economy.
In terms of raw numbers, there is evidence to support the idea that the
financial economy may be growing beyond its proportionate contribution to
9

Simon Johnson, “Financial Oligarchy and the Crisis,” [interview with Harvey Stephenson] The Brown
Journal of World Affairs 16 (Spring/Summer 2010): 167.
10
Ibid., 159.
11
Nikki Tait, “Barnier warns of complacency as reform fatigue starts to loom,” Financial Times
(2011, March 20); accessed June 6, 2011 at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/22c6a6a4-5314-11e0-86e600144feab49a.html#axzz1RoaxHEcQ .
12
Lauren Willington, & Vivek Ahuja, “Bank Pay Rose Almost 10% in 2009,” Wall Street Journal (Online)
(2010, March 3); retrieved from ABI/INFORM Global (Document ID: 1975224401) on 21 March 2011.
13
Tait.
14
Palley, 6.
15
Ibid., 14.
16
Charles Leadbeater, “The Right Kind of Innovation,” Financial World (February 2011): 12.
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economic output. One observes sizable increases in the financial sectors of major
economies in recent years. The value of world financial assets grew from $12
trillion in 1980 to $140 trillion by 2005; the latter figure is over three times the
value of the world’s output of goods and services in that year.17 The International
Labour Organization’s study of national income reported that profits in the
financial sectors of 17 countries rose from 32 percent in 1990 to more than 40
percent by 2005, and that the ratio of wages and salaries in the financial sector
vis-à-vis all workers in the private economy rose from 25 to 38 percent in the
same period.18 From its inception in the 1980s until 2009, for example, trading in
interest rate derivatives exploded to around $390 trillion.19 Similarly, trading on
foreign exchange markets was at around 11 times the total value of global trade in
1980; that figure expanded to 73 times the value of global trade by 2009.20
Freeman notes that the ratio of financial assets to GDP rose dramatically from 1015 percent in the three decades following World War II to 35-40 percent in the
1980s and 1990s.21 But those numbers don’t provide a full picture. Has the
productivity of the financial sector in its contribution to total economic output
justified the observed reallocation of resources in favor of finance?
In assessing the long-term productivity of finance, the Director of
Financial Stability at the Bank of England, Andrew Haldane, notes that in the
United Kingdom returns to intermediation were stable for the period between
1948 and 1978, averaging approximately 1.5 percent of profits in the overall
economy. That ratio, however, explodes to around 15 percent of total profit in the
economy by 2008.22 The United States shows similar increases in growth
measurements of the financial sector. The gross value added (GVA) of the U.S.
financial industry as a proportion of total economy GVA rose from around 2
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1950 to approximately 8 percent
contemporarily. Global bank profits contribute additional evidence, expanding at
an annual rate averaging almost 15 percent between 2000/01 and 2007/08.23

17

Orhangazi, 11.
International Institute for Labour Studies, World of Work Report 2009: The Global Jobs Crisis and Beyond,
2009; cited in Freeman, 167.
19
Leadbeater, 12. Interest rate derivatives are the most common of all derivatives and involve a contract
between parties the underlying asset to which is the right to receive or pay a given sum at a specified rate of
interest.
20
Ibid., 12.
21
Freeman, 167.
22
Andrew Haldane, “The Contribution of the Financial Sector: Miracle or Mirage?”; paper presented at the
Future of Finance Conference, London (14 July 2010), 4. The paper later appeared as part of a chapter coauthored by Andrew Haldane, Simon Brennan, and Vasileios Madouros in The Future of Finance: The LSE
Report (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010).
23
Ibid., 4-5.
18
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These increases presumably are not problematic if finance is playing an
increasingly important role in overall economic production – if gross value added
is indeed an accurate measure and in line with the financial sector’s overall
growth. What gives rise to concern according to Haldane in determining the
contribution of the financial sector is the ability of the system to price risk
correctly. Pavlov and Wachter show how systemic risk in the present crisis has
been caused by asset price inflation as lenders underprice credit in order to boost
their market share.24 Freeman notes that until the recent crisis, the work of
“mathematical finance quants” was presumed good in creating innovative
financial models and associated products that spread risk broadly among those
with greater risk tolerance and worked in combination with investment managers
“who sought to deploy capital more productively.”25 The innovative aspects of
these models are now being questioned. Moreover, the inability of consumers to
directly observe financial risk in combination with inherent complexity in its
determination, the concentration of firms that perform this function, and wild
optimism in assessments of economic growth have led to consistent underpricing
of risk for years. Haldane draws an analogy to the automobile market and the
consequences of “second-hand car dealers consistently selling lemons.” Such
unscrupulous (or perhaps, giving them benefit of the doubt, incompetent) dealers
will be found out because “mechanical risk is observable.” By contrast, risk such
as that which is associated with financial assets is “unobservable” directly by the
consumer (hence the importance of rating agencies) allowing banks and other
financial institutions to underprice risk with almost no immediate consequences.26
Revelations that growth in systemic risk went unchecked for years and
was underpriced industry-wide alters the fundamentals of value-added
determinations for the financial industry. Growth measures in finance suggest that
something resembling this phenomenon we have labeled financialization has
occurred. Reflecting on the crisis in 2010, Greenspan, Mankiw, and Stein
observed that yield spreads on CCC and lesser quality bonds and 10-year
Treasury notes (the broadest measures of credit risk) fell to what were likely
historic lows in spring 2007, with investors’ full knowledge that risk had been
“underpriced for years.”27 The underpricing of risk has encouraged speculative
behavior across the spectrum from governments to corporations to consumers and

24

Andrey D. Pavlov and Susan M. Wachter, “Systemic Risk and Market Institutions,” Yale Journal on
Regulation (Summer 2009): 445.
25
Freeman, 176.
26
Haldane, 9-10.
27
Alan Greenspan, N., Gregory Mankiw, Jeremy C. Stein, “The Crisis [With Comments and Discussion],”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring 2010): 208.
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even to houses of worship.28 Zaharia, et al, note a spiraling effect in the rise of
this risk-friendly system where financial markets have come to “play the role of
social security (without any guarantee)”; moreover, the authors believe
financialization “has annulled the autonomy of the national political economy.”29
Palley characterizes one aspect of the “financialization thesis” as the transition to
a culture where financial markets not only tolerate corporate debt but “prefer that
corporations use debt to finance their activities owing to its tax advantages and
higher rates of return on equity that leverage allows.”30 One might surmise that
the entire system now not only encourages but depends on increasing debt levels
to lubricate the economic engine.
William Lazonick sees the kind of financialization that has become
embedded in corporate decision-making as “the prime source of inequity and
instability in U.S. economic performance.”31 He traces financialization to the
movement toward conglomeration by American corporations in the 1960s and
rising competitive pressure from Japan in the 1970s. These forces led to the
decline of traditional American companies in electronics, steel, machine tools,
automobiles, and other industries and eventually forced the transition to a “new
economy model” that featured offshoring, information and communication
technologies, interfirm labor mobility, and the “intensely speculative and yet
highly liquid” stock market NASDAQ, which fundamentally changed the funding
of firms and ways in which they handled their earnings.32
Lamy notes how many traditional valuation methods of investment banks
faltered when applying traditional techniques to new economy firms, leading to
over-valuation. Data reveals that the stock price for these firms “follows the
macro-economic tendency of the sector more than news or results specific to [the
28

The Wall Street Journal reported that the mortgage crisis has affected many churches in the United States, in
particular, mega-churches that started during the building boom of the 1990s. See Suzanne Sataline, “In Hard
Times, Houses of God Turn To Chapter 11 in Book of Bankruptcy --- Strapped Churches Can't Pay the
Mortgage After Borrowing Binge; St. Andrew at Auction,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), p. A.1.
29
Constantin Zaharia, Ioana Zaharia, Nicolae Tudorescu, George C. Zaharia, “The Magnitude of the Global
Crisis and its Damaging Effects on the Real Economy,” Economics, Management, and Financial Markets
5(3) (2010): 284.
30
Palley, 20. The late Hyman Minsky speculated in his “financial instability hypothesis” that ebullience in
periods of prosperity fuels greater risk-taking and an evolution of credit behavior from hedge to speculative
to Ponzi finance. The last stage is one in which debtors become more highly leveraged while realizing they
are unable to satisfy current debt obligations; in other words, they take on additional debt knowing that they
must either sell assets or take on more debt to make current debt payments. See Hyman P. Minsky, “The
Financial Instability Hypothesis,” Working Paper no. 74, May 1992, 7-8; Prepared for Handbook of Radical
Political Economy, edited by Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer, Edward Elgar. Accessed at
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf on 22 March 2011.
31
William Lazonick, “Innovative Business Models and Varieties of Capitalism: Financialization of the U.S.
Corporation,” Business History Review 84 (Winter 2010); accessed at
http://www.hbs.edu/bhr/84/4/innovative-business-models.html on May 20, 2011.
32
Ibid.
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firms themselves].”33 Excess capacity and overinvestment fueled by deflationary
pressures ensued and business capital outlays declined.34 New economy practices
became the norm and led to the rise of a much more speculative American culture
where everyone, not just executives and institutional investors but also company
employees and individual investors, adopted riskier approaches to investing.
Overvaluation was enabled because traditional ratios were ignored and singular
factors were overemphasized.
Lazonick’s portrayal of the American economy’s cultural transformation
demonstrates the diversity of participants and problems that contributed to the
crisis. The standard players are present: irresponsible and overleveraged
consumers, greedy investors, short-term oriented executives, and oblivious
regulators; in the end, however, a kind of whimsical attitude toward economic
growth and the debt levels necessary to sustain it overtook the nation and
devalued American ingenuity and industriousness. The old economy eventually
soured expectations of a generation that had come to expect extravagant returns
given historical norms; the new economy model has fueled growth in intense
spurts but, as we are coming to discover, risk is less identifiable and growth is less
stable.35 Incentives across the board fed a perfect storm of financial problems that
has affected most everyone in some way.
All these problems would be far less concerning if we could believe with
any assurance that they are in our rear view mirror. The fact is that there have
been few systemic changes to suggest that participants are better informed of the
investment products they sell or purchase, or that regulators now fundamentally
understand the markets they regulate.36 Paul Dembinski sees “ethical alienation”
resulting from “the abandonment or loss of criteria other than those of efficiency,”
and its contribution to a feeling of helplessness among market participants. 37
Financialization is the culmination of this process that has liberated economics
and finance from “metaphysical, societal and political control.”38 What investors
33

Marie-Florence Lamy, “Valuation of New Economy Firms,” Finance India XVIII (Apr/May 2004): 503.
Charles G. Leathers and J. Patrick Raines, “The Schumpeterian Role of Financial Innovations in the New
Economy’s Business Cycle,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 28 (September 2004): 673-674. Leathers and
Raines note how Alan Greenspan championed Schumpeter’s “perennial gale of creative destruction” as the
foundation of robust economic growth in the 1990s without fully understanding the implications of
Schumpeter’s thought. Greenspan disregarded Schumpeter’s “second wave” of the cycle where “pure
financial speculation arrives and may intensify into a speculative mania,” leading to Federal Reserve
passivity in the face of the emerging crisis. See ibid., 669-670.
35
Lazonick.
36
Confusion is particularly apparent in attempts at regulatory reform in Europe, where the EU and Great
Britain have clashed over the appropriate means to stabilize the financial system. See “Darling Warns EU
Financial Regulations Could Be 'Recipe for Confusion,” guardian.co.uk (2 December 2009 ); accessed at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/dec/02/darling-warns-eu-finance-commissioner on 11 July 2011.
37
Paul H. Dembinski, “Financial Ethics Trapped by Financialization,” ethikundgessellschaft 2 (2009): 14.
38
Ibid., 15.
34
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seek today as much as anything is meaning and a sense of purpose for economic
action.
REAL ECONOMIC COSTS OF FINANCIALIZATION
The exact costs of financialization to real economic activity are difficult to
quantify, but there is considerable evidence of costs beyond rising debt loads on
governments, corporations, and individuals. Hao Li observes how seemingly
unrelated commodities like copper, soybeans, and crude oil move in a
“synchronized boom-and-bust cycle” because of speculation and, in particular, the
aggressive position of institutional investors in commodity futures facilitated via
financial firms like Goldman-Sachs.39 Such movement exaggerates the “natural”
business cycle and has the potential to deepen global recessions. The
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 2009, which analyzed
data from some 120 recessions and recoveries since 1960, concluded that
recoveries from economic slowdowns connected with financial crises require
almost three years to reassume the level of output prior to recession and extended
an average of 18 months in duration beyond those unassociated with crises.40
Freeman, citing data from the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, reported that
losses in the present crisis amounted to 8 million American jobs between January
2007 and October 2009.41 Globally, the International Labour Organization has
estimated that employment in advanced countries associated with the recent
recession, assuming normal levels of growth, will not recover until 2015.42
Loose availability of credit is known to have radically escalated loan
defaults in the U.S. vis-à-vis historic norms. Interestingly, the allure of easy
money seems even to have changed the nature of default. Changes in the credit
culture and its underlying rules have reversed a long-established pattern by
American consumers of defaulting on credit card or auto loans before defaulting
on their mortgages; consumers today engage in “jingle mail” in a climate where
the shame of losing one’s home is vanishing. Homeowners mail their keys to
mortgage lenders and walk away, assuming the penalty to their credit scores and
seeing it as the least detrimental option available to them. Others engage in
another form of “strategic default” by simply continuing to live in their homes
without making their mortgage payments – in some cases for years – depending
39

Hao Li, “Financialization of Commodities Poses Threat to Real Economy,” International Business Times
(November 30, 2010); accessed at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/87204/20101130/financialization-ofcommodities-poses-threat-to-real-economy.htm on 7 June 2011.
40
Cited in Freeman, 171.
41
Council of Economic Advisors. 2010. Economic Report of the President. 2010 Report Spreadsheet Tables,
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables10html [accessed 26 May 2010]; cited in ibid.
42
Freeman, 171.
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on the political costs of foreclosure to lenders and general bureaucratic confusion
to keep them at bay.43 Some have suggested that the blind spot of rating agencies
to the emerging crisis resulted from these changes in credit behavior.44
Kedrosky and Stangler have shown evidence of brain drain to financial
services from other sectors of the American economy increasingly in need of
engineers, scientists, and other professionals to move them forward. Graduate
students at the nation’s elite colleges and universities turn to finance as a career in
greater numbers than they did only a couple of decades ago, which has significant
“entrepreneurial consequences” for American culture. They note that by 2006,
“the Securities and Commodities Exchanges sub-sector accounted for the twelfthhighest share of science and engineering employment by sub-sector, ahead of
semiconductor manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications.” 45 The
authors also produce data suggesting that financialization may well have limited
not only the quantity but the quality of new firm formation in the U.S.46
Haldane estimates the total production costs to the global economy
resulting from the financial crisis at between 60 and 200 trillion dollars and stated
that history suggests these costs will be “persistent” if not “permanent.”47
Regardless of permanence, financial volatility has investors, producers, and
consumers reeling from its effects and economic stagnation appears to be with us
for the foreseeable future.
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL COSTS
Beyond the real economic costs are perceived social and ethical effects of
financialization that may be just as consequential for long-term stability. O’Boyle,
Solari, and Marangoni note three in particular: 1) “progressive separation of
economic activities from social norms”; 2) “loosening of moral values in
economic decisions”; and 3) “dominance of financial gains over other economic

43

Paul Wilson, “CBS Says Not Paying Your Underwater Mortgage ‘Best Hope for Some to Stay Afloat,”
Business and Media Institute; accessed at http://www.mrc.org/bmi/articles/2011/CBS_Says_Not_Paying_
Your_Underwater_Mortgage_Best_Hope_for_Some_to_Stay_Afloat.html on 27 June 2011.
44
Gillian Tett, “Insight: A New Wave of Grime Lurks,” Financial Times (May 22, 2008) [ft.com]; accessed at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d177753a-280a-11dd-8f1e-000077b07658.html#axzz1OtarTs28 on 7 June
2011.
45
Paul Kedrosky and Dane Stangler, “Financialization and Its Entrepreneurial Consequences,” Kauffman
Foundation Research Series: Firm Formation and Economic Growth (March 2011): 7; accessed at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/financialization_report_3-23-11.pdf on 7 June 2011.
46
The authors contend that a smaller financial services sector might create companies of “higher social value”
and “cause fewer distortions in capital allocation.” Ibid., 14.
47
Located at http://shockedinvestor.blogspot.com/2010/03/bank-of-england-financial-crisis-cost.html.
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considerations, such as meeting basic human material needs.”48 By generating
complex institutions and instruments to facilitate capital movement,
financialization exacerbates the “economic indirection” that British author and
social critic G. K. Chesterton viewed as a morally detrimental aspect of the
Industrial Revolution. Chesterton feared that capitalism obscured “causes and
consequences” from market participants, making moral action difficult.49
Similarly, financialization interjects levels of arcane interactions in capital
transfer that make it hard to determine the real contributions of individual actors,
the real value of assets, and the ethical standards by which the financial system
operates.
Reallocation of wealth and rising income inequality commonly are
associated with the financialization of capitalism. But it is not only income
inequities that are changing social relationships. According to Ronald Dore,
financial “disintermediation” is breaking down traditional relationships where
banks have facilitated connections between depositors and borrowers,
depersonalizing the system of capital provision.50 That transformation is altering
long-term social bonds that have supported the capitalist system for centuries:
Once [borrowers and lenders] depended on trust as much as on collateral, and
carried some sense of personal or corporate obligation. Now there are only
contractual property relationships which can only be enforced in courts. This is
one of the important changes contributing to the general erosion of trust among
51
the members of any society.

Degradation of trust may be worse than Dore believes. Corporate bailouts,
renegotiations of mortgage contracts, and various “emergency measures” to
resolve financial problems demonstrate that law is no longer the sole standard for
enforcement of business obligations. Depersonalized relationships in combination
with the willingness of politicians to intervene in contractual arrangements have
led to the denigration of law as a standard and to possibilities for opportunistic
behavior.
Financialization has helped contribute to creation of a pervasive gambling
culture where fiduciary managers follow new conventions in putting the assets
under their control at risk in attempting to achieve competitive returns. Ideas of
“responsible risk” for state government officials, managers of pension funds,
portfolio administrators for religious organizations, stock traders and many others
48
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changed markedly in the 1990s. By 2004 37 states in the U.S., even some
traditionally conservative southern states like Georgia, were funding portions of
their education systems with substantial revenues derived from lotteries.52
Alison Kemper and Roger L. Martin believe that the financial crisis has
fundamentally redefined the business-society relationship and calls for a new
generation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) theories.53 They see CSR prior
to the crisis as dominated by theories of the firm grounded in the neoclassically
influenced Chicago School of Economics and therefore incapable of observing the
kinds of “risks and negative externalities” that would have prescribed action to
prevent financial mismanagement and misreporting that have contributed to
present problems.54
Absent understanding of financial processes and the chains of ownership
reflected in their maze of monthly statements, investors become increasingly
unsure of what they own and who reaps the rewards of their investment activities.
Given the dominant role of the market in the U.S. and the rising detachment of
individual voters from the political process, it is arguable that the greatest source
of value expression in American society today comes via economic transacting.
Yet financialization has contributed to confusion in the values expressed through
investing. An analogy to this kind of social and moral confusion is to ask how
voters would react if, after a national election, it was disclosed that some problem
in the voting system had randomly cast votes for candidates across the country.
That kind of indeterminacy is being exposed throughout the financial system;
investments are often beyond investor comprehension. Socially responsible
investing (SRI) and faith-based investing are positive developments in seeking to
combat this trend, but they face significant challenges in keeping with the pace of
financial innovations. Increasingly, investors are unsure of what they own and
uncertain of who is compensated in transaction linkages and at what level and
even why. Ethics are atrophied by such a system.
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Ethicists and theologians from various Christian traditions have weighed
in on the costs of financialization. Bob Goudzwaard, an economist who is a
member of the Reformed Christian tradition, is among those who see the dwarfing
of the real by the financial economy and society’s pursuit of what he terms a
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“paper god” as uniquely defining of our economic times.55 Goudzwaard notes
how the escalation of “debt money” has fundamentally altered economic
relationships. Goudzwaard identifies the real economy as “the part of the
economy that involves making, selling, and buying goods and services, from
groceries to shoes to doctors’ visits to garbage collection.”56 By contrast he
observes the dramatic growth in money-for-money transactions, citing economist
Herman Daly’s estimate that the total amount of money-for-money exchanges
now exceeds by some 20 times the total value of transactions in which paper is
traded for “real commodities.”57 This reapportionment of real and money
economies over the past few decades has contributed to valuation problems;
prices lose their ability to convey worth in an environment where asset
complexity leads to misinformation and exchanges are increasingly speculative,
creating potential for the corruption of ethics.
St. John’s professor of economics Charles M.A. Clark has offered a
“Christian perspective” on the crisis and he sees three principal factors
contributing to it: “greed, rising inequality, and the ‘bad’ creation of wealth.”58
Clark references the theories of John Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky on
financial instability and the continued development of “money manager
capitalism” that has magnified the influence of the money economy over that of
the real economy and enabled a situation where “economic activity became
separated from the goal of meeting human needs and improving social welfare.”59
Clark sees the 113.1 percent growth in net worth from 1997 to 2007 – in a time
when gross national income grew by only 49.1 percent – as pointing to an
unhealthy escalation of monetary valuation over real production.60 He contends
that wealth generation, detached from real production, is at least suspect from the
Christian view – when it enhances community and social justice it is good, “but
when wealth is created by merely redistributing wealth, incomes or economic
rights to the already wealthy, it is bad.”61
Pope Benedict XVI is particularly critical of financial speculation “that
yields to the temptation of seeking only short-term profit, without regard for the

55

Bob Goudzwaard, “A Paper God: How Out-Of-Control Buying and Selling of Money Led to Our Current
Crisis,” Sojourners (June 2009): 22-26.
56
Ibid., 23.
57
Ibid., 24.
58
Charles M.A. Clark, “A Christian Perspective of the Current Economic Crisis,” The American Economist 53
(Spring 2009): 18.
59
Ibid., 17.
60
Clark, 23. Clark offers as the source for his table data the World Bank World Wealth Reports from various
years.
61
Ibid.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2010

13

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 2 [2010], Art. 1

long-term sustainability of the enterprise, its benefit to the real economy.”62 Use
of the term “real economy” presumably implies an economic system of tangible
goods and services produced by human labor that contributes to a Catholic
conception of social good. The pope recognizes that increasing “layers”
(institutional, technological, and others) in the financial system not only
compromise its stability but also divorce workers from the products of their labor.
Benedict suggests the need for “restoration” in finance – a return to a time
(perhaps idealized) when the financial system targeted not only material but fully
human development – where the entire financial system is “to be aimed at
sustaining true development.”63 Such a transformation requires that “financiers
must rediscover the genuinely ethical foundation of their activity, so as not to
abuse the sophisticated instruments which can serve to betray the interests of
savers.”64 Both consumers and investors must understand their moral roles to the
realization that all purchases and investments involve moral discernment and
social responsibility. Financialization sees wealth creation and maximization as
the ends of human activity but for the Catholic social tradition, those ends must be
balanced with solidarity where “the economy displays solidaristic characteristics
because institutions relate the individual to the whole community.”65 Maragoni
and Solari insist that at the rule-level, solidarity aims to assure “a sound
institutional environment for economic activities.”66 Financialization and its
esoteric practices, in contrast, have no preference for the soundness of the
institutional environment or the solidarity of workers and investors.
Benedict applauds the concepts of “micro-credit” and “micro-financing”
for providing an alternative view to the massive structure of global finance,
consistent with what he calls “ethical financing” and with insistence on
personalism in all forms of commercial transactions.67 But microcredit has been
controversial in recent years with charges of lacking a clear philosophy, excessive
dependence on government subsidies, high rates of default, limited numbers of
credit recipients, and even fraud.68 The complexity of the microcredit question
and Benedict’s seeming acceptance of it as “good” is evidence that more intense
theological reflection on the real purpose of financial intermediation is necessary.
Despite broad criticism of the financial economy by Christians, churches
appear conflicted on the issues in many ways, likely due at least in part to the
62
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complexity of their own investments. The Church of England, for example,
announced in April 2011 that it would not support the compensation system of
any of the companies that are part of its $5.3 billion investment and property
portfolio if executive bonuses in those companies exceed four times their basic
pay. It is unclear how the Church arrived at the 4-to-1 ratio and it would not
disclose the specific companies that would not be “supported.”69 Such statements
are consistent with the Church’s history in promotion of economic justice, but
also consistent with past statements in the sense of their rather ambiguous
theological and ethical grounding. In October 2009, the Anglican Church
defended its investment in the “oft-reviled pillar of the finance industry” – hedge
funds – despite the fact that it had earlier criticized traders who engage in shortselling as “bank robbers and asset strippers”70; yet short-selling is commonly
associated with hedge funds. To justify its investment in hedge funds the Church
signed a letter along with other charitable foundations in England that contained
the statement: “Maximizing the returns on our investment portfolios is an
essential part of delivering our foundations’ missions, for the benefit of society.”71
The point is not whether hedge fund practices are consistent with the
values and tenets of the Church of England but rather that such a criterion was
apparently subordinated to profit maximization, which itself is evidence of the
extent of financialization. It is also interesting that this decision came on the heels
of a very bad year for the Anglican Church investment-wise, with the value of its
investment portfolio dropping from English pounds 5.7 billion to 4.4 billion
between 2007 and 2008.72
The Church of England remains embroiled in controversy over heavy
losses from its pension plan in which all assets were invested in stock markets. In
the words of pension consultant John Ralfe, the Church “just decided to go double
or quits at the casino.”73 This comes after charges of the Church’s financial
mismanagement throughout the 1990s. By the end of 2008 its pension fund had
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declined to a shortfall of English pounds 352 million.74 The Anglican Church, as
many institutions, was caught up in an investment hysteria that fostered the
attitude that big money could be made quickly with little risk. The fact that the
Church of England’s pension fund was invested more aggressively than those of
similar organizations even as it was criticizing investment practices that
undoubtedly were represented in its portfolio illustrates both the allure of easy
profits and the complexity of the problem. According to Bartley and Barrow the
problems of the Church of England demonstrate a “dislocation of financial
decision making from integral mission and economic justice, which is both
practically and theologically deficient.”75 One question is how Christian and other
religious institutions can avoid financial practices that may violate their values in
a climate of rising financial sophistication where all organizations see maximizing
return on investment as necessary to survival. On the answer to that question
hinges perhaps a larger one: whether religious traditions can make a positive
contribution to economic ethics by developing theological and moral principles to
guide believers in investment decisions and commercial activity generally.
THEOLOGY OF THE “REAL ECONOMY”
The relationship of theology and economy is not generally obvious although for
some the connection is unmistakable. Catholic lay theologian Jung Mo Sung
states that “every economy comprises implicit theological assumptions.”76 Some
fringe Christian groups such as the Reconstructionists have contributed extensive
theological treatises on economics and finance.77 Mainstream American
Christianity too has seen a far closer relationship with the economic establishment
in the past than exists today. Robert Nelson observes the theological origins of the
American Economic Association, noting that 20 of the AEA’s founding members
“were former or practicing ministers” and that one of the most prominent of that
group, Richard T. Ely, viewed the teaching of economics as a “religious subject”
74
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that should take place in formal academic departments of the nation’s divinity
schools.78 In practical terms, Social Gospel preachers and theologians responded
to the Great Depression by lobbying for the Emergency Banking Act of 1933; the
legislation enabled the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to purchase
approximately one-third of American bank stock in the attempt to avert financial
crisis.79 Active involvement of theologians in academic economics and
professional institutions is no longer common. Mark Nixon suggests there has
been “renewed attention to the relationship between theology and economics” in
particular during the pontificate of Pope John Paul II,80 but constructive economic
theologies that articulate theological perspectives on what economy is for are rare.
The Balkanization of disciplines likely has contributed to the separation of
theology and economy. Regarding finance in particular, the Christian Church’s
prophetic voice has been tested as higher demands are placed on technical
expertise and as churches have been drawn into investments that are increasingly
difficult to comprehend and thus to reconcile with their doctrines and values.
Christians may recognize the good of finance from the perspective of faith
even while disagreeing on technical aspects of its implementation. Pope Benedict
recognizes the good of “ethical finance” even as he sees the need for a “sound
criterion of discernment” to provide consistency in its identification.81 There is
concern, however, that financial practices are changing more rapidly than the
ability of religious ethicists to assess their moral implications. Derivatives, hedge
funds, and certain securitized investments embody practices subject to common
religious criticism of the financial system. But what about investing in companies
that have been accused of excessive compensation for executives? Or investment
in companies that in hindsight engaged in “risky” financial practices because they
considered them necessary for survival? How can religious investors and faithbased fund managers wade through the maze of financing procedures and
determine which are consistent with their traditions? Would every major bank in
the U.S. have been off limits to groups of religious investment funds three years
ago if we knew then what we know now? Some of the practices that are reflected
upon today as financially reckless and ethically suspect were until recently
thought to contribute to stable and real economic growth.
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Some might contend that the present financial crisis has exposed the
estrangement of economy and theology. Financialization confronts religious
ideals of the human person with the reality that some individuals can thrive in a
materialistic sense without need for tradition or moral reflection on economic
action. Recent instability suggests that there are questions not only of individual
morality but also social sustainability with respect to this assumption.
Theologically based definitions of real economic production are needed to help
guide adherents in consumption and investment decisions and to provide
substance to criticism of financialization by religious leaders. Such visions of
economic life are essential in challenging a value-neutral, positivistic science of
economics that has emerged as perhaps the most defining aspect of modernity.
Theologies of the real economy necessarily will engage what constitutes
tangible contribution and just reward; and real contribution implies work toward
some end consistent with the values and principles that are the ground of these
theologies. Such is the basis for common religious prohibitions of investment in
firms that engage in pornography or gambling. Financialization has revealed the
need to go beyond proscriptions of certain behaviors – constructive theologies are
needed that demonstrate what economic action is for in development of individual
and community. Many are convinced of the ethical root cause of the present crisis
while lacking the ability to pinpoint specific transgressions that have led to it.
Unlocking the religious imagination can help bring out deficiencies of the present
financial system in ways that cannot be accomplished through human reason
alone. As Gerard Magill observes, “the religious imagination suggests a
distinctively theological way of reasoning in ethics” through employment of
metaphor, development of images, claims to objective truth and other means that
draw “an inseparable connection between the economy, labor, and personal
flourishing in the Christian realization of the image of God.”82 Theology exposes
the frequent ungroundedness of economic action and the need to preserve
teleology in all human activity.
In Divine Economy: Theology and the Market, Long observes the early
development of something like a theology of the real economy in Christian
tradition. Contrary to the modernist critique, he notes how the “conquering of the
usury prohibition” by economics was not simply a matter of overcoming medieval
theologians’ economic ignorance. There was recognition even by Aquinas of the
possibility that money could be made in lending. Usury objections by the
Thomists sought to preserve the “connection between one’s labor and one’s
compensation,”83 which in turn was essential to preserving social relationships
and real economic production. Importantly, the Scholastic tradition sought to
82
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ensure that no individual participants were unduly saddled with the risks of
economic activity. Nixon shows how property ownership in Thomist economics
contributed to the flourishing not only of the individual but of society by enabling
people to care for what they own, promoting social order, and preventing conflict
over objects of possession through clearly assigned ownership rights.84 This
aspect of Christian tradition is thus consistent with what Freeman sees as the two
principal objectives of financial economics: 1) to spread risk among participants
such that no particular individuals or institutions are burdened with risk that is
unbearable and 2) efficiently direct capital to areas where it is most productive.85
These goals are highly consistent with most Judeo-Christian and Islamic
traditions.
Contributors to a theology of the real economy should be wary of past
tendencies to closely align religious norms with those of various forms of political
economy. Long has been critical in the past both of liberation theology that allies
itself too closely with Marxism as well as the kind of emergent and largely
conservative, pro-market theology in that both “employ an analogia liberatis as
the decisive site where God can be recognized.”86 In these views, human
liberation, with or without need for revolution, is the closest the human person
can come to understanding God. Long believes that the path to true development
should more follow in method the work of Bernard Dempsey and Alisdair
McIntyre and their reliance on an “ancient notion of a ‘functional economy’” that
emphasizes virtue, intermediate institutions, and subsidarity in social relations as
“an alternative to modern economics.”87 Dempsey, the Jesuit priest and Harvardtrained economist, built upon the Scholastic theologians’ distinction between
interest and usury in his explorations of modern economies, and he emphasized
preservation of “value relationships” in exchange by preventing their distortion by
monetary forces.88 The key is ensuring that money exchanged for goods
corresponds to the actual values held by participants to transactions. Exchanges
where asset complexity is so great as to be near incomprehensible or where the
time an asset is held is so brief that the owner cannot truly value it in any
meaningful way appear to violate Dempsey’s value theory by allowing “the
possibility of an income which was never earned” and the possibility for future
gains based on that unearned income. According to Dempsey,
84
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If money does not so change hands as to express accurately these value
relationships [of physical objects], then the relations themselves are altered
rather than expressed by the money sums paid for them. When investment is
made with funds that have never been income and, before being income, have
89
never been cost, such a derangement is theoretically inevitable.

This statement describes a primary objection to financialization by Christian
critics – that money is made (or lost) with funds that are not generated income by
the investor and where there is no sacrifice to the investor. It is also the necessary
starting point in defining the real economy: any system of real economic
production must provide that monetary exchange represents participants’ actual
values. Complex monetary systems often distort values and whir out of control in
their detachment from real production. Real production involves real risk and
contribute toward some vision of the good grounded in institutional and
individual values; and real exchange ensures that those values are accurately
expressed.
Complex monetary instruments often create an illusion of security and riskfree profit, and because they often lack grounding in savings or real assets of any
kind, have virtually unlimited possibilities for expansion. Dempsey was largely in
agreement with Austrian economist Ludwig Mises that there are some types of
“fiduciary media” where “no natural limitations exist” on the quantity of its
production.90 Long notes that while for Mises this was simply the working of a
market economy, for Dempsey such a process of unlimited fiduciary expansion
was “institutional usury.”91 Long describes Dempsey’s theory of the way in which
forms of “circulation credit,” where no sacrifice is required of its issuers, limits
development of both worker and society:
Once profit on investment is separated from savings, it is also separated from
one’s work. Perfection of personality cannot occur, and the economic life is
reduced to a large lottery system where profit can be made, but this profit will
92
have no connection to a person’s proper work or function.

For Dempsey what is real in economic life are those activities that contribute to
the development of human personality, and his Catholic orientation insisted that
such development must take place in community. His statement also suggests that
the process we have described as financialization – where profit increasingly is
based on leverage rather than real assets with quantifiable risks, and where returns
89
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come more via a lottery-like system than based on tangible production – prevents
the development and perfection of human personality.
Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan, lamenting the lack of basic
understanding of economic action in his day, stated: “When people do not
understand what is happening and why, they cannot be expected to act
intelligently. When intelligence is a blank, the first law of nature takes over: selfpreservation.”93 Lonergan insisted that union of ethics, economics, philosophy,
and theology was necessary for the preservation of democracy itself. Economic
intentionality must be preserved for the development of virtue and of intelligent,
moral actors in self-sustaining democratic polities. True development depends on
achievement of harmony among many disciplines in a “system” that preserves
intelligent, moral action.
New theologies are needed to engage the issues at the heart of the present
crisis: risk, return, scarcity, efficiency, financial complexity, and
contribution/reward. These concepts are changing rapidly and require ongoing
theological reflection to understand their consequences for virtue development,
economic sustainability, and religious tradition itself. Niels Gregersen provides a
possible path forward in development of a “theology of risk taking” that while not
specifically addressing finance, shows that the “concept of risk is intrinsically
coupled with the concept of complexity” and that globalization of risk has
resulted from vast systemic interdependencies.94 Christian theologians have too
often fallen into the modernist trap of assuming lack of connection between risk
in the physical (including financial) world and the spiritual insights of their faith
traditions. Gregersen destroys the assumption by illuminating “a surprising field
of interactions between theology, the natural sciences, and the social sciences.”95
The starting point for a theology of risk is the understanding that certainty does
not exist in the material world; purposeful action necessarily incurs the possibility
of failure or even danger to one’s well-being. Risk is inherent in all human
undertakings but the “nature of risk” associated with unique investment methods
and instruments will vary vis-à-vis Christian ethical perspectives. As Gregersen
observes, the early Church itself was an institution at risk, nomadic in origins and
subject to perpetual danger as an alien society in the Roman Empire. The
Disciples gave up what worldly security they possessed to follow Jesus. The very
history of Christianity demonstrates that communal risk sharing is a fundamental
to the faith because “in an interconnected world, risks are shared risks, and the
93
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Creator did not withdraw from the ethics of sharing risks, even to the point of
death.”96
Philip Goodchild has proposed a “theology of money” that explores how
money impacts the society in which it exists: the politics surrounding and the
means by which it shapes social relationships. He sees reform of the monetary
system as a necessary part of what he calls “the new theological agenda.”
Goodchild sees the boundaries established by money’s finite nature being
overcome through rising levels of credit and debt. We deny the limitations
imposed by fixed monetary resources through endless generation of credit, but
this has led to the “demonic hold that debt has over our lives.”97 Debt is not
simply a rational issue but a spiritual one as well, as shown in the Judeo-Christian
concept of the Jubiliee, which acknowledges limits on debt and property rights
grounded in an overarching view of Creation. Theologies of financial
intermediation may engage scriptural resources on capital formation that
demonstrate principles by which resources were allocated in early Christian
communities. Certainly relevant for Christians is The “Parable of the Talents”
(Matthew 25:14-30; Luke 19:11-27) where the risk-averse servant who buries his
talent in the sand is punished by the master while the other two who traded theirs
and received the additional rewards from the master. This parable has
implications for concepts like entrepreneurship and responsible risk-taking. New
explorations of Luke 16 are needed to address the call for responsible
administration of wealth (Luke 16:11) and the pronouncement that no one can
serve both God and money (Luke 16:13).
Human flourishing that is the goal of the real economy requires extensive
institutional support. Theologian William Cavanaugh observes that “the modern
bureaucratic state” is incapable of providing “real answers about true human
flourishing”98; thus, citizens seek their own models of fulfillment beyond the state
– that is the idea behind liberalism. Such a system depends on intermediary
institutions to fill the void between the individual and state in promoting personal
development and the social good. The modern corporation is ill-suited to such a
task as well – indeed, financialization has only intensified focus on its own
survival – and other intermediary associations have declined in importance with
the rise of economic globalization. Religious institutions are unique in their
concern for human development, providing definition to holistic flourishing not
96
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simply material success. Theologies are capable of defining real production in
ways that avoid getting drawn into the drone of criticism that leads nowhere
because it has no vision. At least theoretically, what Christianity, as well as
Judaism, Islam, and other traditions bring to the table in this debate is vision, and
histories of ethical construction that inform economic life.
Cavanaugh sees the problem at the heart of financialization not as one of
greed and materialism but rather as the human desire to “transcend material
constraints” altogether. According to Cavanaugh, it is a phenomenon where
consumers and investors seek creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing), a process
that only God can accomplish:
The desire to transcend material limitations is perhaps most powerfully reflected
in the multiple ways that the global economy has gotten detached from reality.
The ubiquitous practice of maximum leveraging is basically an attempt to build
99
assets out of debt – which is to say, out of nothing at all.

The perspective of classical economics is flawed, according to Cavanaugh, in
viewing economics as a “tragic” conflict resulting from “the infinite nature of
human want” being perpetually constrained by the “finite nature of material
resources.”100 The core problem is denial of the spiritual nature of economics and
engagement in a “fantasy that people can be free from vulnerability, that profit
itself can be made risk-free.”101 Cavanaugh grapples theologically with basic
economic principles – scarcity, risk, trust – in ways that point toward a
fundamental reorientation of economic life that embraces its spiritual dimension.
He posits that the financial crisis was not precipitated by the “failure of trust”
noted by analysts but rather “more fundamentally on the attempt to overcome the
necessity of trust.”102 Trust in Smithian market economics is sustained through the
value of reputation, but the impersonal nature of the global economy combined
with the increasingly casual acceptance of bankruptcy, bailouts, and other
procedures grounded in political authority have lessened the power of reputation
to engender trust. Even worse, “profit can be made from distrust itself, by offering
to guarantee loans between mutually suspicious parties.”103 Theological
development of real economic principles begin by addressing the loss of trust in
economic life.
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Cavanaugh points to perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the crisis and
one to which Islamic economists almost universally have called attention where
he states “there is no divide between spiritual and economic matters, and the
biblical writers would have found any such divide to be perverse or completely
unthinkable. They recognized that there is a ‘spirituality’ embedded in all kinds of
economic practice, whether we acknowledge it or not.”104 Moreover, he cautions
against overreliance on the state to extricate us from problems; the state today is
more “enabler” rather than problem solver, looking to “pick up the pieces when
reckless market behavior leads to disastrous consequences.”105 This observation
reflects a crisis of expectation where “people do not so much look to the state to
defend them against corporate power and financial predation – they look to the
state to defer the consequences of a sick economy to some future time.”106
Positive change in the economic culture must come from non-state institutional
sources that have the potential to reorient human expectations toward particular
conceptions of human flourishing.
Christian theologies of the real economy will vary in content. Hollenbach
suggests that even among Catholic orders “differing emphases of spirituality”
means that these traditions will “have different perceptions and emphases in their
relation to society and in their use of material goods.”107 Methods for
development of economic theologies, however, will have much in common,
involving:
• Exploration of religious texts and human experience to better
understand the purpose of economic action
• Interpretation of contemporary economic experience in “an
explicitly transcendental or metaphysical mode of reflection” 108
• Derivation of theological principles applicable to immediate
economic contexts
• Application of these principles to real world situations in the
practice of “critical theology”109
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Terminology is critical for the development theologies of the real
economy. The term “real” as applied to economic life will have different
meanings for different persons. For the professional economist the word typically
denotes inflation-adjusted measures of income and production, but for those
practicing theological economics it describes action that contributes to human
actualization viewed from an expressly religious perspective. A theology of the
real economy must blend systems of natural justice with what T. S. Eliot
described as “the natural end of man – virtue and well-being in community –
[that] is acknowledged for all, and the supernatural end – beatitude – for those
who have eyes to see it.”110 Financialization today threatens such religious
conceptions of the human person.
Writing on his blogspot, Rice University economics professor Mahmoud
Gamal suggests that forbidding and permitting certain financial practices based on
Islamic jurisprudence in an era of “financial engineering” is “incoherent” and
ultimately self-defeating. Gamal does not deny that religious teaching might work
to place societies on financial paths that ultimately are more sustainable but he
suggests that attempting to force a society on a more sustainable path is a losing
proposition:
Careful and equitable societies get cannibalized by greedy and fast growing
ones. As they say in finance, “the market can stay irrational longer than you can
stay solvent.” Likewise, fast growing societies can continue their unsustainable
growth path long enough to destroy other societies on more sustainable paths.
That is why we need a global social contract on sustainable growth and prudent
111
finance.

Gamal is likely correct that economic competition will weed out noncompetitive traditional values. Markets are subject to deterministic forces such as
the rise in complexity, concentrations of power, asymmetric information, and
other factors that have contributed to the crisis. But practices promoting
financialization have come to be known ex post for the most part. Theologies of
the real economy and their influence on faith-based investment offer possibilities
for dealing with phenomena like financialization, but only if they are able to
develop rules to guide financial activity. The complexity involved in these
determinations, much as the complexity involved in finance itself, will be
immense. But such complexity insists that it must begin from a theological
foundation or it will inevitably founder.
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Can any global social contract of the kind Gamal proposes be
accomplished? Dominance of an intense international competitive ethic among
nations seems to preclude such agreement. A bottom-up ethical transformation of
financial culture – while perhaps still a long-shot – would seem as likely as the
transformation of international political economy through social contract. In the
end it is the values of participants that must change to prevent future financial
crises of the kind we are witnessing.
In 2004, members of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches came
together in Accra, Ghana to discuss and respond to the challenges of
globalization. They developed unique theological perspectives on the problems of
the global economy.112 An even broader ecumenical discussion is needed today to
address the spiritual and moral effects of financialization and to bring to light its
potential impacts on economic sustainability, virtue development, and religious
tradition. Refining what are largely theologically ungrounded criticisms into
constructive arguments reinforced by tradition may contribute to grassroots
transformation of the global investment culture. Perceived limits to “secular”
regulation and the possibility for unintended consequences in regulatory reform
suggest the need for changes within the market culture in establishing a stable and
ethical foundation for the world economy. Richard Freeman contends that a
lesson of the recent crisis is that “reforming finance will be an uphill battle
requiring the countervailing power of groups outside the sector in order to
succeed.”113 That countervailing force cannot be realized only in the form of
government regulation, which has proven insufficient to maintain financial
stability. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives reinforced this point in
July 2011 when they “peppered U.S. regulators” about the need to raise capital
requirements for American banks.114 Representatives, apparently fearing the
consequences for the international competitiveness of the American banking
industry, have been reluctant to raise capital requirements despite the painfully
obvious observation that inadequate bank capital has been a fundamental source
of present problems. Freeman notes that “regulatory and political failure to act
should not be viewed as some factor exogenous to the crisis” for regulatory
inaction and ineptitude have resulted from the embedding of regulatory authorities
112
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in a highly politicized economy that is inclined toward preserving the status quo.
115

There are certain ways in which religious perspectives on our financial
problems “see beyond” the technical critiques of economists and market analysts
to the heart of the crisis. Development of theologies of the real economy from the
perspectives of different faith traditions can inform discussions concerning the
reestablishment of ethics and stability to the global economy and offer guidance
to millions of investor-adherents worldwide. An immediate need is the
reorientation of finance through development of theology centering on real
economic activity – not simply calls for the elimination of injustice but
constructive theological dialogue on what the financial economy is for.
Financialization is more insidious than government corruption or corporate
collusion. Its destructive consequences result from natural patterns of economic
development and the rational incentives of participants that go beyond even the
most devious intentions of any government, corporation, or social class. Its
reversal cannot be accomplished through government regulation or appeals to
corporate responsibility. Fundamental transformation of the investment culture is
needed.
CONCLUSION
One reason for the hopeful contribution of religious traditions in stabilizing the
global economy concerns the apparent limits of secular alternatives. Stiglitz
observes that transparency was a cause but not the cause of the crisis; greater
transparency can “ensure that incentive structures do not encourage excessively
risky short-sighted behaviour” but that alone will not solve the problem.116 Allen
and Yago see complexity as a major villain,117 but one must ask how complexity
is effectively reduced in financial markets. What will be the regulatory or market
force that rewards those financial firms that create instruments of greater
simplicity? Will governments be able to force reduction in complexity and greater
transparency on financial firms? Additional government regulation in the attempt
to achieve simplicity is a virtual oxymoron. No regulatory framework is capable
of harnessing a financial system incentivized toward more speculative investment
based on increasingly complex instruments; moreover, regulation inevitably risks
unintended consequences.
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Mortreuil makes the rather outlandish comment that “regulation must lead
to virtuous behavior, which is quintessential to virtuous culture.”118 It is difficult
to believe that virtue can be reestablished through regulatory reform. One might
assume that more modest goals of transparency and fair play will do as regulatory
aims for the present. But Mortreuil’s point is apt in suggesting that virtue must
come from somewhere.
Much as Lazonick observes that the real culprit in the crisis was a
transformation in the culture of corporate investing that spread speculative
behavior to many players in the American economy, so too it will likely take
another reformation of the investment community to reestablish stability. Looking
to regulatory schemes to “save us from ourselves” as financial complexity
increases will be massively expensive and, in the end, likely ineffectual. Worse, it
may open new opportunities for those willing to exploit information asymmetries,
concentrations of market power, legal loopholes and inexact ethical boundaries
for the achievement of greater financial gains.
While casting about for villains in the crisis, one should remember that
financialization results as much from the demand as the supply side of the
equation. It is consumers who insist on unrealistic returns as much as the
professionals in financial services who devise intricate instruments to achieve
those returns who today protract the problem. If we continue to expect that
“industrial activities may generate a 5 percent margin, while financial services
should generate a 15 percent margin,”119 then we should be unsurprised when
investors act recklessly, salespersons act deceptively, and the entire system
degenerates ethically. This also is the principal reason why regulation has limits;
just as in the War on Drugs, attempts to restrict supply in conditions of high
demand will lead only to massive expenditure, continued conflict, and inequity in
reward. Those who seek lavish returns commensurately with minimal risk and
economic justice often chide the ineffectiveness of the regulatory regime, but the
very need for regulation comes from those unrealistic demands. Religion is an
institution uniquely positioned to ground investor expectations in ways that can be
more effective than acts of regulatory agencies.
Religion’s contribution to the reinvigoration of economic ethics must go
beyond moralizing. There will be over-the-top criticism such as the Archbishop of
Westminster’s words comparing the compensation of financial professionals to
the pedophile priest scandal of the Roman Catholic Church.120 But positive
theological development of what constitutes real economic development is what is
118
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needed. The “meaningful engagement of theology and finance” is no longer some
disciplinary oddity to be pursued at the margins of academia; “investment
theologies” are needed not only to help adherents navigate the maze of investment
choices but also to contribute to a much-needed reformation of the financial
economy. These theologies must be based on more comprehensive theologies of
the real economy that identify types of economic activity that are consistent (and
inconsistent) with the values and practices of faith traditions. There is need for
theologies of scarcity, risk, etc., as those outlined by Cavanaugh across traditions
to guide investors desiring to express their values through capital. Religious
organizations should not only foster such development but apply it within their
own portfolios to provide institutional witness to the possibility of religious
investment.
We are left with Gamal’s observation that nation-states (and presumably
the institutions within them) that do not seek to maximize return based on
economic criteria will be outcompeted and eventually extinguished. But
financialization has revealed that attempts at short-term maximization may lead to
long-term instability. Might religious investing help combat short-termism and
help elongate the time horizon for profitability assessments? Religious
determinations of real economic activity are inherently teleological in a way that
secular assessments are not. They point toward measures of “good” consistent
with traditional values and practices. In this way, theologians and ethicists can
make unique contributions toward eradicating financialization but only if they
offer definition to what constitutes real production.
Whether theology can aid the “de-financialization” of the global economy
remains to be seen. Identifying those practices that contribute to financialization
and devising theological principles to address them will be difficult. Religious
critics are right to see financialization as a major problem – perhaps the major
financial problem of our age. They are also to be commended for seeking to
combat it. Truly tackling the problem requires theological and ethical
development to consistently articulate what is real and what is illusory in
economic life – particularly in the labyrinth that is contemporary finance.
Individual believers have the responsibility to become educated in financial
practices and their traditions’ assessments of those practices. Perhaps the best way
for religious investors to reverse the trend of financialization is, consistent with
evangelical Charles Colson’s advice, simply to be faithful to their own traditions
– to become investor witnesses.121 In this way they engage a means of selfempowerment that should be both a spiritual and natural response to the
intricacies of the financial society.
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